The credit rating industry has historically been dominated by just two agencies, Moody's and S&P. In response to such limited competition, the past decade has seen many calls for increased competition from legislators and regulators alike. The wisdom of such a mandate is unclear. We argue that the material entry of a third rating agency (Fitch) offers a unique experiment to empirically examine how in fact increased competition affects credit ratings. What we find is relatively troubling. Specifically, we discover that increased competition from Fitch coincides with lower quality ratings: rating levels went up, the correlation between ratings and marketimplied yields fell, and the ability of ratings to predict default deteriorated. We offer several possible explanations for these findings that are linked to existing theories.
Introduction
Credit ratings make information about default likelihoods and recovery rates of a security widely available. 1 Because they are shared for free, they limit duplication of effort in financial markets. They also allow uninformed investors to quickly assess the broad risk properties of tens of thousands of individual securities using a single and well-known scale. Ratings are relied on extensively in regulation and private contracting, and as a tool for measuring and limiting risk. 2 For these reasons, ratings constitute a key channel of information dissemination in financial markets and are considered important by legislators, regulators, issuers and investors alike. 3 While the importance of a viable ratings industry seems clear, the provision of accurate ratings is made more complicated by the peculiar market structure of the industry. Ratings are issued by rating agencies, such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's (S&P) and Fitch Ratings. Once produced, they are publicly available and freely disseminated. Rating agencies directly charge the firms for the securities they rate, but the investors who use these ratings observe them at no cost.
The quality of ratings is therefore quite relevant for the proper functioning of the financial system. 4 There is seemingly broad consensus among policy makers and regulators around the potential benefits of increasing competition between ratings providers as a tool for improving Of course, the users of ratings (such as investors who consider buying a security) desire accurate ratings. However, firms whose securities are rated prefer favorable ratings, and not necessarily accurate ones, as it directly lowers their cost of capital. Since rating agencies' revenues come from issuers, a basic tension exists between the desire of raters to please individual paying customers and the raters' need to maintain the overall precision and informativeness of credit ratings. 1 The majority of ratings of corporate securities relate to corporate bonds. Other corporate securities, such as preferred stock, are frequently rated as well, as are government bonds (at the municipal, state and federal levels) and structured financial products (such as CMOs, CDOs, etc.). See Table 1B for an overview of ratings categories. 2 Commercial banks, insurance companies and pension funds are among the institutions facing regulatory rules based on credit ratings. Many investors can only hold securities with investment grade ratings (e.g., pension funds, money market funds) or are required to use different amount of capital based (e.g., insurance companies) on the ratings of securities they hold. 3 See Graham and Harvey (2001) for a survey of financial executives' attitudes toward credit ratings, Campbell and Taksler (2003) for recent evidence on the effect of ratings on corporate bond prices, and Tang (2006) for the information transmission of ratings. Kisgen (2006) shows how firm capital structure decisions are affected by rating considerations. 4 Early on, rating agencies tried an alternative revenue model that charged users of ratings. This model suffers from being very dependent on the enforcement of contractual limits to how customers can share ratings information they receive. As pointed out by White (2002) , the change from user-paid to issuer-paid ratings as the dominant model "in the early 1970s coincides with the spread of low-cost photo-copying". Rating agencies derive revenue from various sources apart from issuers' fees, such as subscriptions to historical databases. ratings quality. For example, Paul Schott Stevens, the President of the Investment Company Institute, stated "I firmly believe that robust competition for the credit rating industry is the best way to promote the continued integrity and reliability of their ratings" 5 in testimony for a US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. 6 In this paper, we wish to examine the effect of increased competition in the ratings industry and shed some light on the issue of whether or not it tends to improve the quality of ratings. In the area of U.S. corporate bonds, the ratings industry offers what seems like a clear instance of increased competition. Historically, competition between ratings agencies has been rather limited.
In fact, until the late 1990's, two agencies -Moody's and Standard & Poor's (S&P) , founded in 1909 and 1916, respectively -were the dominant rating agencies of U.S. corporate debt. Other agencies, such as Duff & Phelps, which entered in the early 1970s, were considerably smaller.
Founded in 1913, Fitch Ratings is as old as the main agencies but has been historically much smaller. However, starting in 1989, and particularly since its acquisition by a French investor in 1997, Fitch has invested in growing its market share with the aim of becoming an alternative to The empirical merits of this push for competition are not at all well established, and existing theories provide some conflicting messages. 7 Over the decade that we study, starting in the mid-1990s, Fitch's share of corporate bond ratings issued increased from around 10% to approximately a third of the overall market. The CEO of Fitch stated in a 2002 letter to the SEC: "since 1989 when Fitch was recapitalized by a new management team, Fitch has experienced dramatic growth… Fitch believes that our emergence as a global, full service rating agency capable of competing against Moody's and S&P across all products and market segments has created meaningful competition in the ratings market for the first time in years" (Fitch Ratings 2002) . Important to the construction of our empirical tests, Fitch's growth has varied considerably across industries. For example, in 2005-2006, Fitch's market share 5 See http://www.financial-planning.com/asset/article/527499/fund-industry-group-calls-more-credit.html 6 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) now recognizes ten firms as Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Agencies, thereby granting their ratings regulatory status. 7 In structured products, Fitch's presence was significant even early on, and there is no clear parallel to the changes we examine in the area of corporate bonds. Of course, this limits the applicability of our findings to the recent financial crisis, where ratings of structured securities have been particularly called into question. See, e.g, Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009). was highest in real estate and construction, retail trade, utilities, construction and finance. Fitch remained relatively less represented in agriculture, educational services and transport. The largest gains (increase from 1997-98 to [2005] [2006] were in public administration, real estate and construction, waste management and related, and retail trade.
In this paper, we examine the impact of increased competition on ratings quality by exploiting the industry-level variation in Fitch's market share. Specifically, we examine how the quality of ratings issued by the incumbent agencies, S&P and Moody's, responds to the new competition presented by Fitch. Empirically, we focus on two dimensions of quality: the ability of ratings to transmit information to investors and their ability to classify risk. The basic intuition behind this interpretation of quality is as follows. Ratings that are correlated with future defaults and current bond prices perform well in terms of information transmission. Ratings classifications that are stable (in how they map credit quality to ratings) perform well for classification purposes. If contracts specifying investment restrictions to securities of only certain ratings (e.g., investment grade bonds) are to work effectively, ratings categories need to have a stable meaning. A similar argument holds for any regulation that relies on credit ratings (i.e., capital requirements that vary by ratings category). In other words, we treat ratings inflation as lowering the quality of ratings. 8
The evidence we uncover appears unequivocally consistent with lower ratings quality as competition increased. First, ratings issued by S&P and Moody's increased (moved closer to the top rating of AAA) as competition intensified. Second, the ability of S&P's and Moody's ratings to explain bond yields decreased with competition. In other words, credit ratings are less informative about the value of bonds when rating agencies face more competition. Third, the ability of firm level ratings to predict default is lower when Fitch has a higher market share (for data reasons, we use only S&P ratings for these tests). In one specification as an example, speculative grade firms are 7.7 times as likely as investment grade firms to default within three years when competition is at the 25th percentile, but only 2.2 times as likely to default at the 75th percentile. Overall, these three sets of findings paint a pessimistic picture about the effect of competition on rating agencies' behavior.
Naturally, interpreting our results as evidence on the causal effect of competition on incumbent behavior is only valid if competition is exogenous to the variables we study. There are several possible concerns with this assumption which we deal with in a variety of ways. The first relates to the endogeneity of Fitch's market share: could the market share in a particular industry be driven either directly by future changes in ratings levels or indirectly by some omitted variable that also affects ratings? We address this concern in several ways. Apart from firm variables, we control for industry and year fixed effects in all our regressions, ruling out any overall time trends or other purely cross-industry explanations. We also find that Fitch's growth does not appear related to the most obvious measures of credit growth. Fitch's market share is not statistically related to increases in demand for debt in an industry, the number of ratings issued in an industry, or several measures of industry profitability (for a range of lead and lag relationships). Thus, it does not appear that Fitch found it easier to enter in good times or bad. Perhaps Fitch's growth was driven by labor market frictions or luck (i.e., the particular departments where Fitch was more successful in hiring simply grew faster). Lastly, we find that individual bonds which are rated by Fitch tend to have lower ratings from S&P and Moody's. Therefore, the positive effect of competition on ratings likely does not reflect the aggregation of firm-level selection. Taken together, these findings suggest that reverse causality is unlikely to drive the correlation between ratings quality and Fitch's market share.
Another possibility is that Fitch might find it easier to enter and grow in industries where S&P and Moody's neglect firms and therefore produce uninformative ratings. This would generate an omitted variables bias producing a correlation between ratings informativeness and competition.
However, this does not explain the results about ratings levels, and leaves unexplained the basic issue of why S&P and Moody's would neglect certain industries at all. Yet another suggestion is that Fitch's ratings are more in demand when default is harder to predict, possibly owing to industry opacity or rates of industrial change. This could also generate the observed pattern of weaker predictive ability for ratings issued when competition is high. This story does not appear consistent with our findings for the level of ratings (i.e., why would ratings be higher when default is difficult to predict?). Furthermore, we can test the predictive ability of other variables. It turns out that accounting variables are not worse predictors of firm default when competition is high. Hence, the weaker predictability of rating likely does not reflect a particularly difficult informational environment.
In a further attempt to compare alternative explanations for our findings, we use an instrumental variables regression. This should help address more generic endogeneity concerns regarding Fitch's market share. We use the predicted market share in each industry from 1996 and onwards by extrapolating from Fitch's 1995 market share. These tests rely on the fact that Fitch's growth was predictably slower in those industries where initial market share was high. Because predicted market shares are formed using only information from 1995, they cannot reflect events late in the sample, so any endogeneity must involve great foresight by industry participants or very long-run, reverse causality, which seems unlikely. Interestingly, our empirical findings here of the negative effects of increased competition on ratings quality are only stronger.
Granting our findings about how competition coincides with worse ratings quality, there are several potential explanations that derive from a number of theories. First, this pattern could reflect a reputational mechanism at work in which future economic rents motivate current (unobserved) quality. If increasing competition from Fitch reduced expected future rents for the incumbents, the incentives for quality provision were consequently reduced. Second, it is possible that the empirical evidence is suggestive of ratings shopping. We consider each of these explanations in turn.
Our findings of reduced ratings quality could be related to a reputation story. Since ratings predict future default events, which are infrequent and can be far off in the future, feedback about the accuracy of ratings is slow and imprecise. In this setting, raters' concern for their reputations as providers of honest and accurate ratings may help sustain ratings quality (see Cantor and Packer (1994) and Smith and Ingo (2002) A theoretical literature that begins with Klein and Leffler (1981) argues that the formation of reputations can help support quality provision in markets where information problems would otherwise preclude it (see also Diamond 1989 , Mailath and Samuelson 2001 , Bar-Isaac 2005 , and Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008 ). In the standard setting, users care about output quality. However, they can only assess the quality of a seller's product after using it, so they must make purchase decisions without this information. A second explanation for our results could be the phenomenon of ratings shopping proposed by Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2009) . The claim is that issuers shop around for good ratings and that the ratings we ultimately observe in the data tend to be the ones that were considered most positive by issuers. There is presumably greater scope for such shopping if there are more raters from which to choose. In their model, rating agencies are more prone to inflate ratings as the fraction of naïve investors (i.e., those who follow disclosed ratings such as in Boot, Milbourn and Schmeits (2006) ) increases. Their model aims particularly at explaining the ratings of structured financial products in the credit boom of the late 2000s.
In practice, the phenomenon of ratings shopping is likely to matter much less for the firms and corporate securities whose ratings we examine, since Moody's and S&P both have a policy of rating all taxable corporate bonds publicly issued in the US and their issuers. Even if an issuer refuses to pay for a rating, the raters publish it. 12 pattern drove industry-level results, we would find a negative correlation between Fitch's presence and ratings levels. In fact, we find the opposite: when Fitch has a higher market share in that it rates more bonds, ratings are higher. Therefore, ratings shopping, which is arguably the most likely cause of endogeneity, appears to matter in the data, but can be ruled out as an alternative explanation of our findings that higher competition coincides with more issuer-friendly ratings. If anything, ratings shopping will lead us to underestimate the effect of competition. 13 We conclude that competition most likely weakens incentives for providing quality in the ratings industry, and thereby undermines quality. The reputational mechanism appears to work best at modest levels of competition. There are a number of caveats and limitations to our findings, and several qualifications to the conclusions we draw. First, we only consider corporate ratings, not ratings of CDOs, mortgage-backed securities or other structured products. 14 Second, our findings have limited implications for the efficacy of reputational mechanisms in other imperfectlycompetitive settings, since the ratings industry is particular in many ways. For example, Hong and Kacperczyk (2008) find positive effects of competition among equity analysts (see also Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Hong and Kubik (2003) for work on reputations and equity analysts). These markets are different in many ways, including the underlying revenue model (equity analysts are paid indirectly by the institutional investors who use their recommendations, not by the firms they analyze) and the rate at which feedback occurs (equity analysts make short-term predictions, whereas many corporate bonds are first rated ten or even twenty years before they mature, before which time any evaluation of the rating's accuracy is typically incomplete). 15 13 Skreta and Veldkamp (2008) provide a model where the prevalence of ratings shopping is linked to the complexity of the security, such as in the case of more complicated asset-backed securities. The intuition behind their story is similar to the winner's curse in auction theory in that each rating agency is assumed to produce an unbiased, but noisy signal of quality (a rating) for a risky security. The more complex the underlying security, the noisier the rating process will be and the greater is the likelihood that one particular rater will be at the high end of the spectrum. The issuer of the complex security prefers higher ratings, and is more likely to shop around to find one if the odds of getting a high rate are sufficiently great. While this is an interesting and very palatable story, it is unlikely to affect the securities we study here. That is, complexity may have explained ratings inflation and ultimately the poor quality of ratings in the structured finance space, it seems less applicable to the non-financial corporate bonds (what we examine). In addition, it is not at all obvious why more deterioration in quality took place in industries with greater market presence by Fitch.
Third, we disregard many potentially important aspects of reputation, such as how the reputational mechanism varies 14 Doherty, Kartasheva, and Phillips (2008) examine the effect of competitive entry among rating agencies of the insurance market. In contrast to our findings in the corporate bond arena, they find that going from one to two raters (S&P entered as a competitor to the incumbent A.M. Best) led to improved rating content, using a particular model of what ratings should be for individual cases. 15 Other industries where reputations have been studied empirically include auto mechanics (Hubbard (2002) ), online trading (Cabral and Hortaçsu (2006) ), and restaurants (Jin and Leslie (2003, 2008) ). over firms' life-cycles (see Diamond (1989) ) and how entry decisions are made (Mailath and Samuelson (2001)).
There are important regulatory implications of our findings. As a policy matter, encouraging competition may reduce monopolistic (or in the case of ratings, oligopolistic) rents, but our findings consistently suggest that it is not likely to improve quality. The fact that ratings quality seems to decrease with competition provides support for the standard economic theories of reputation (e.g., Klein and Leffler (1981) ) as well as the related predictions about competition that Bolton et al (2009) provide for the ratings context. These findings indicate that quality in the ratings industry relies on rents that reward reputation-building activities which are costly in the short run. The reduction of such rents reduces the amount of reputation-building, i.e., high quality production, in equilibrium. For policy makers and regulators, the benefits and costs of competition must be carefully compared.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss credit ratings and the underlying industry in more detail. In Section 3, we present the predictions of various theories, and the methodology used to test them. We present the data in Section 4 and results in Section 5.
Concluding remarks can be found in Section 6.
Credit ratings: business model and regulation
A credit rating is an assessment of the creditworthiness of a corporation or security, based on the issuer's quality of assets, its existing liabilities, its borrowing and repayment history and its overall business performance. Ratings predict the likelihood of default on financial obligations and the expected repayment in the event of default. There are two main types of ratings. Bond ratings are provided for a vast majority of publicly-traded bonds in the United States (U.S.). Firm (or Issuer) ratings are produced by each of the three main agencies for all U.S. public firms that issue public debt. Credit ratings range from Aaa (or equivalently, AAA) to D (see Table 1B for an overview of the ratings levels for the three main rating agencies and the numerical value assignments used in our empirical work)
Issuers seek ratings for a number of reasons, including to improve the marketability or pricing of their financial obligations, to increase their trustworthiness to business counterparties or because they wish to sell securities to investors with preferences over ratings. Investors, financial intermediaries and regulators use ratings as an indicator of the risk and likely repayment of securities. Also, certain categories of institutional investors are obliged by regulation to rely on ratings for their investment decisions. For example, the amount of capital required for banks and insurance companies who own securities varies with the credit rating. There are also regulatory constraints forcing some investors (e.g., insurance companies and Savings & Loan institutions) to only hold debt securities of investment grade (i.e., with a rating of BBB or better).
Ratings are typically shared freely by the rating agencies; whose revenues derive from charges to the firms whose credit quality is being assessed. Fees for bond ratings typically consist of a fixed fee per year coupled with a larger upfront fee, charged when the bond is first rated at time of issuance. 16
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has designated certain firms as "Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations" (NRSROs).
Paying for firm ratings is voluntary, although raters will only consider non-public information provided by the firm itself if they receive payment from the corporate issuer (see Jorion et al. (2005) regarding raters' access to non-public information). Rating agencies also provide various other types of ratings, such as short-term credit opinions and various industry-specific ratings. They may also derive revenue from selling analysis and other services to investors. 17 The ratings of these firms can be used for various regulatory purposes, and many investors will only consider ratings by an NRSRO when making investment decisions. This may also make entry in the industry more difficult. 18 Some argue, as SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, that "the unintended consequence of the SEC's approach to credit rating agencies was to limit competition and information flowing to investors.
The legislative history reflects a genuine concern that the SEC facilitated the creation of -and perpetuated -an oligopoly in the credit rating business. Indeed, today, three NRSRO-designated firms have more than 90 percent of the market share." 19
Hypotheses and methodology
We aim to compare ratings quality under different intensities of competition. Our measures of quality are based on the idea that ideally, ratings should have a stable meaning and accurately predict defaults. Various users of ratings may in fact have slightly different views on this.
Legislators and regulators rely on ratings categories being consistent over time and across firms and industries, so that regulation can use ratings to control and limit risk taking. The SEC (2003) wants to promote "credible and reliable ratings". 20 Consistent ratings criteria may also be attractive for private contracting (e.g. for bond mutual funds that invest in certain ratings categories).
Presumably, investors generally want ratings that are informative about risk and default. 21 We use several complementary approaches to evaluate rating quality. Our first approach appeals to ratings level. We argue that lower quality ratings will be on average higher ratings, that is, ratings closer to the AAA end of the spectrum since this must be the universal desire of the issuers as the subject of the ratings. It is worth recalling why shifts along the rating scale are a problem. Such shifts may in theory allow similar information transmission. However, the practical requirements are fairly steep: all investors have to be able to decipher how the market structure is affecting ratings. In particular, the least sophisticated investors, who likely need ratings the most, will be the least able to follow time-variation in the meaning of ratings categories. Even if information transmission is maintained as categories change meaning, regulation and legislation relying on ratings will be adversely affected. Such rules tend to be slow-moving and not easily adapted. They therefore require ratings categories to have stable meanings. For these reasons, a shift in categories may generate considerable difficulty for users of ratings. Summing up, ratings levels are a natural place to investigate whether rated firms exert pressure on ratings firms, because issuers are likely to have the direct preferences about the level. Other measures of ratings quality, such as default prediction, are perhaps more important to the financial system, but less directly related to issuer preferences. A general increase in ratings levels is a direct implication of competition if competition leads to ratings reflecting issuer preferences instead of credit quality (as suggested by reputational models). 20 Policy makers may also like ratings that do not fluctuate too much, in order to stabilize financial institutions. This is an aspect of quality where we do not expect competition to be particularly important (since neither issuer nor investor is likely to have a clear preference). We therefore leave this issue out of our empirical work. 21 However, current holders of bonds may desire high ratings for the bonds they own. Especially under mark-to-market accounting rules, some investors may prefer not to get bad news in the form of downgrades.
There is probably some cross-sectional variation among firms with regards to their preferences for better ratings. We exploit cross-firm variation in the likely importance of ratings to various issuers. Specifically, we predict that any effect of competition would be stronger for firms with higher leverage, which rely more on debt to finance their operations and investment. 22
Our second approach purports that high quality ratings should also be informative about bond values. We use market prices of debt to assess the informativeness of ratings. Lower quality ratings mean that ratings will reflect things other than expected repayment, and ratings levels will thus be less correlated with bond yields. We examine the correlation of ratings with bond yields (conditional on various controls known to correlate with yields). That is, we ask if ratings contain information about bond values beyond easily observable characteristics, such as bond covenants and firm fixed effects.
This allows a form of a difference-in-difference test, where we compare the effect of competition on ratings for different groups of firms. Using a range of measures of leverage, we find that the effect on ratings is higher for more levered firms, consistent with the idea that ratings tend to reflect issuer preferences more as competition increases.
Our third and final approach contends that since ratings aim to predict default, we can test their predictive power econometrically as competition levels change. We relate default events three years out to current ratings, either to actual ratings categories or simply broad indicators for whether a firm is assigned an investment grade rating, and allow the effect of ratings to vary with competition. Ratings are also meant to predict recovery rates in default, but data on these is much harder to collect (in part because bankruptcy proceedings can be lengthy and their outcomes complicated).
In all of the above tests, we rely on the use of Fitch's market share as a measure of competition, where market share is the number of bond ratings issued by Fitch as a fraction of those issued by the three raters in total. An advantage of using individual bond ratings is that it affords us a very large dataset. Another advantage is that the measure is simple and can easily be replicated.
However, this is clearly not an ideal measure of competition, and revenue share would probably be preferable. Unfortunately, data on prices and revenue from the agencies is not readily available. As a robustness test, we have also used an alternative measure of competition, the log of the number of ratings issued by Fitch in an industry-year. This variable is not mechanically affected by any decisions of S&P and Moody's, and may therefore be considered cleaner than Fitch's market share from an identification standpoint. Results with this alternative measure of competitive pressure are with few exceptions statistically stronger, and with slightly larger magnitudes than the results presented in the paper. 23
Data
Data on bond ratings and market shares are drawn from the Mergent Fixed Income For each bond rating issued by Moody's or Standard and Poor's, we identify the preceding rating of the same bond, as well as whether the bond has been rated by Fitch. We have used 4-digit industry classifications with very similar results throughout, but prefer 2-digit industries for two reasons. First, using larger industries reduces the noise in market shares estimates, reducing measurement error. Second, it's not clear that narrow 4-digit industries are actually competitively distinct (for credit rating agencies competing for business). The advantage of getting a larger number of distinct observations by using narrower industries does not seem to compensate for these disadvantages. 24 In tests, we use the total market share for each industry-year. This figure presents moving averages of total monthly market share across industries in order to provide a sense of the time path of Fitch's entry. 25 Potentially, market share increases due to organic growth and increases due to acquisitions have different competitive impact, and including data from 2000 may make our results less representative. We have rerun our ratings levels regressions (Tables 3, 4 and final payment. We use a numerical procedure to estimate yields to maturity. Because of the sample restrictions (e.g., no floating rate bonds), this is straightforward and fairly fast, and the precise numerical procedure is immaterial. We calculate yield spreads by subtracting the yield for the government bond with closest maturity (disregarding the timing of coupon payments) from the yield to maturity. Government bond yield data is from the Federal Reserve's H15 reports. For each bond in the sample, we identify the initial issue yield and match that to an initial credit rating.
An overview of the most important variables is presented in Table 1A . The number of observations for Fitch's market share refers to the number of industry-year cells. Bond ratings categories are, as mentioned, described in Table 1B .
Empirical results
This section presents our evidence from the various tests of rating quality and how it is affected by changes in the competitive landscape of rating agencies.
Bond and firm credit rating levels
The first test concerns the level of firm credit ratings. We regress firm ratings on Fitch's market share. Results are presented in Table 2 . In column one, no controls are included. Errors are clustered by industry-year cell, since this is the level at which our variable of interest varies (this applies to all tests where relevant). In this sample, there is a significant positive correlation between competition and credit ratings, suggesting that more competition pushes ratings toward the higher end of the rating spectrum (i.e., toward AAA). This pattern is clearly visible in Figure 2 which plots the frequency of each rating for industry-years with high and low values for Fitch's market share.
As the graph shows, all investment grade ratings (i.e. BBB-and above) are more common under high competition, and all junk bond ratings (i.e. BB+ and below) are more common under low competition. In other words, the figure and the regression analysis offer complementary evidence that competition is correlated with higher ratings.
The estimated coefficients in column one may be unreliable since no controls are included.
In column two, we rectify this by including year and industry dummies. This pushes up the Rsquared, and reduces the coefficient and standard error on competition. The coefficient on Fitch's market share remains positive and significant. The magnitude is modest but non-trivial. For a one standard deviation change in competition (0.142), average ratings are predicted to increase by 0.19.
This corresponds to a one rating step upgrade (e.g., BBB+ to A-) of approximately one out of every five firms. Since the variable used to capture competition is likely to be noisy, the estimated coefficient is biased toward zero by measurement bias. The true magnitude may therefore be larger than that implied by our coefficient estimate. 26 significant, and the implied magnitude is close, albeit slightly smaller, corresponding to approximately one in nine firms.
In the regressions reported so far, we do not control for any time-varying features of a firm.
Obviously, these may affect a firm's creditworthiness. If Fitch's market share happens to be correlated with these factors, that could generate a bias in our results, or even spurious findings. In column four, we include eighteen accounting-based firm controls related to firm size, profitability, and indebtedness (see Table 2 for a description of the controls) to capture any time variation in firms' performance. The estimated coefficient on Fitch's market share is very similar to the one found in the previous specification.
The OLS specifications implicitly treat every step of the left hand side variable as equal.
There is no reason for this to be how ratings categories work, however. In column five, we run an ordered probit regression instead of OLS. This specification allows each cut-off to be separately estimated and so implicitly allows the effect of dependent variables to vary across different parts of the of the ratings scale. Therefore, the regression uses data more efficiently (although it may be less robust to certain econometric problems than OLS). The coefficient on Fitch's market share remains positive and significantly different from zero. The marginal effect of competition is estimated to be positive and significant at the 5% level for the rating categories AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-, BBB+ and BBB. It is negative and significant at the 10% level for BBB-, and negative and significant at the 5% level for all lower rating levels.
As a robustness test, we next collapse the data by industry-year cell, explaining the average or median of ratings in the industry and year with the average (median) of all firm controls, as well as industry and year fixed effects. The cell averages are based on between 25 and 339 individual firm ratings (industry-years with less than twenty-five observations are excluded). These specifications differ in many ways. First, they avoid concerns about correlated errors and repeated sampling of the same bond, since there are only 160 observations. Second, they put much less weight on cells with many bonds (since each industry-year cell is treated equally), which may have an important effect on the estimated coefficients if the effect of competition is not homogeneous.
Third, all within-cell variation is thrown out. Coefficient estimates using collapsed data are presented in column five and six. The estimates for Fitch's market share are significant and positive, and imply magnitudes similar to that implied by the coefficient estimate in column one (a one notch rating change for one in four or five firms). Overall, the firm rating results contained in Table 2 suggest that ratings become more favorable to issuers when competition increases.
We turn now to ratings of individual bond issues, as opposed to the firms that issue them.
Such tests should provide further evidence of how increases in competition among rating agencies affect ratings. In Table 3 , we report the estimates of regressions of individual bond credit ratings on Fitch's market share. The number of observations is very large, since many firms issue very many bonds and since most bonds are rated repeatedly. We include a range of fixed effects in order to control for observables. In column one, we report a regression of ratings on Fitch's market share,
controlling for year and industry fixed effects, as well as fixed effects for the lagged rating of the same bond (i.e., the most recent rating by either S&P or Moody's, whenever it occurred) and time to maturity (rounded to the nearest number of years) fixed effects. Competition enters with a positive sign, suggesting that more competition tends to increase ratings, consistent with the result for firm ratings. The coefficient on Fitch's market share implies that a one standard deviation increase in competition is expected to increase ratings by an average of 0.06 steps (that is, one in 17 bonds will see an increased rating of one step), a smaller effect than that estimated for firm level credit ratings).
Often, the same bond appears many times in our data. This means we can include bond issue fixed effects, and estimate the effect of competition holding the subject of the rating fixed (of course, important aspects of a bond may change through time). In column two, we include bond issue fixed effects (making industry fixed effects redundant). In this specification, Fitch's market share is again positively and significantly related to ratings (the estimated effect is approximately 20% larger than without bond fixed effects). This result rules out that our findings are driven by any time-invariant differences between bonds, and is akin to studying changes in ratings.
The statistically robust link between competition and poor incumbent ratings quality is consistent with theories where competition causes low quality of ratings, but also with theories that imply the reverse direction of causality. We attempt to address endogeneity concerns by controlling for whether a bond is rated by Fitch. Controlling for Fitch's presence in individual bonds addresses the concern that Fitch tends to rate bonds with either high or low ratings (and hence that competition is correlated with the left hand side variable due to reverse causality). In particular, we might find a positive correlation between competition and ratings if Fitch systematically rates bonds with high ratings. In column three, we include a dummy variable equal to one if Fitch has rated the same bond during the calendar year in question. 27 The Fitch dummy enters with a negative sign, implying that individual bonds receiving a Fitch rating tends to be those where an incumbent agency's rating is low (conditional on regression controls). This suggests that if anything, selection effects will bias the coefficient on Fitch market share downward (since Fitch's market share will be higher in industry years where many bonds have a Fitch rating). In other words, whereas bonds in industry-year cells with a big Fitch presence (what we interpret as competition) tend to receive higher ratings, the particular bonds that are rated by Fitch within an industry-year cell tend to have low ratings. The estimated coefficient on Fitch market share is still positive and significant. These results are consistent with our interpretation that competition increase ratings, while firms with worse ratings seemingly gravitate towards Fitch (tending to generate a negative relation between Fitch's presence and ratings levels). 28
In practice, financial firms issue a very large proportion of corporate bonds. In column four, we exclude issuers belonging to NAICS 52 from the sample in case bonds in this industry are fundamentally different from non-financial firms' bonds. The sample size is approximately cut in half, and the estimated coefficient is somewhat larger, corresponding to an upgrade of roughly one in ten bonds for a one standard deviation increase in Fitch's market share. We next collapse the data by industry-year cell, as done for firm ratings, explaining the average or median of ratings in the industry and year with average (median) maturity and lagged ratings, as well as industry and year fixed effects. The cell averages are based on between 10 and 7,914 individual bond ratings (industry-years with less than ten observations are excluded). Since the variation across cells in the number of bond ratings is even larger than for firm ratings, collapsed results may differ even more from the full panel results in this setting. The estimated competition coefficient for both average and median ratings is large and significant (at the 10% level for averages and 1% for medians). The implied magnitudes are larger than in the individual bond regressions (corresponding to an upgrade of one in three bonds for averages and two in three bonds for medians). This may reflect any of several factors. First, the different weighting scheme putting more weight on industry-year cells Adding up selection effects across many bonds, therefore, cannot explain our competition finding. 27 Varying the time window has only a minor impact on the regression results. For example, using a dummy equal to one for bonds for which Fitch has ever issued a rating, or for those for which they assigned a rating at the time of issue, both yield very similar regression results (the coefficient on the market share variable is similar). 28 The negative coefficient on the Fitch dummy for individual bonds is less robust to reasonable variations in regression specification than our competition variable.
with few bond ratings. Second, all within-cell variation is thrown out. Third, to the extent that endogeneity biases coefficients against our findings (because firms are more interested in a third rating when S&P and Moody's issue relatively low ratings), the collapsed results may be less biased. The pattern that firms with lower ratings tend to get a Fitch rating, seen in column three, was identified within industry-year cells. This pattern may be weaker or absent at the industry level (for example, because industry level presence is more driven by Fitch's access to skilled labor).
We next consider cross-sectional variation in the impact of competition on firm ratings. The effect of competition should be felt more acutely for those firms that are likely to care more about their ratings. We use firm indebtedness to identify firms with a greater concern for ratings. In Table   4 , we interact Fitch's market share with four measure of indebtedness: leverage (debt over assets), long-term leverage (long-term debt over assets), a high leverage dummy (leverage is above the median in the firm's industry) and debt divided by EBITDA. These specifications allow us to include industry-year interaction fixed effects (i.e., approximately 400 dummies), thereby reducing any concern about omitted variables that are correlated with Fitch's market share and vary within industries and years. Without exception, the interactions of competition and debt are positive and highly significant. This suggests that the effect of competition is disproportionately felt for firms which are more likely to care about their ratings because they rely heavily on debt financing. This is consistent with the argument that competition makes ratings more responsive to firm preferences.
Regressions of ratings levels at both the firm and security level, with and without extensive control variables, as well as estimated either in full or collapsed panels, all consistently suggest that a high Fitch market share coincides with higher ratings.
Identification issues raised by ratings level results
There are two main identification concerns here. First, certain firms or bonds might be more likely to be rated and thus show up in our data. Since both S&P and Moody's have explicit policies to rate all American issued taxable bonds and the issuers themselves, there is most likely very little selection into being rated at the firm level. Second, Fitch's market share may not correspond to a random experiment, causing either reverse causality (Fitch enters markets with high ratings) or omitted variable bias (some factor drives both higher ratings and entry by Fitch). We discussed above how the most obvious reverse causality actually works against our findings, as firms with low ratings are more eager to ask for a third opinion. This pattern is confirmed directly in bond-level regressions. Hence, reverse causality may bias the coefficient estimates on Fitch's market share to zero, but seemingly cannot explain our findings. On the other hand, an omitted variable bias is harder to rule out as conclusively. One possibility is that Fitch found it easier to grow their market share in booming sectors where credit demand was high (perhaps overwhelming the capacity of S&P and Moody's to rate bonds).
We test this directly by regressing Fitch's market share on leads and lags of five proxies for ratings demand in an industry: the number of ratings issued, the log of the total amount of outstanding debt of Compustat firms in an industry, the annual change in this variable, an assetweighted average of the ratio of return of assets (EBITDA over assets) in Compustat firms in the industry, and the median of ROA across Compustat firms in the industry. We separately regress each of the industry-year observations of one of the credit demand proxies on Fitch's market share, controlling for industry and time fixed effects. Results are presented in Table 5 . There seems to be no correlation between the various measures of demand for credit and Fitch's market share (one coefficient out of twenty five is estimated to be significant at the 10% level, which is slightly fewer than the expected number from a random sample with no relation). These tests do not explain what drives Fitch's market share, but shows that ratings demand is not likely a main driver of relative market shares. Furthermore, the "easy entry in good times" explanation for the ratings results presented above has no implication for the informativeness of ratings. The reputational theories do, however. These theories predict that favoring issuers will compromise the information contentthat is, putting more weight on the issuer's preferences when determining ratings implies less weight on rater's information about credit quality. We turn to these tests next, and return to the discussion of which theories are consistent with the various findings after that.
Bond yields and ratings
The next step is to examine how the information content of ratings responds as competition changes. To do this, we test how the conditional correlation between ratings and bond yields responds to competition. The dependent variable is the yield spread to the closest maturity Treasury bond. Results are reported in Table 6 . In column one, we control for a recent credit rating by S&P or Moody's as well as Fitch's market share. We also include industry fixed effects and bond characteristics as controls (e.g., time to maturity and size of bond issue). Bond trades occur at different times, and interest rates are likely to be an important source of time series variation in yields, so we include fixed effects for each date (specifically, each month-year pair). The coefficient on credit ratings is negative and significant, confirming that bonds with better credit ratings trade at lower yields, controlling for other observable factors. The coefficient on the interaction of credit rating and Fitch's market share is positive and significant, implying that the correlation of credit ratings and bond yields is lower when there is more competition. Going from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of competition, the effective coefficient on ratings falls by a third. This is consistent with the view that competition reduces the information content of ratings. This result is robust to the inclusion of year-industry fixed effects, as seen in column 2. This regression produces results that are very similar to the previous specification (the sample is slightly smaller because for some trades, no matching treasury bond can be found, often because the bond's maturity is too long). 29
Observe that these tests are based on actual bond trades, where the same bond can appear multiple times. One concern is that multiple trades capture the same information, and thus we include numerous bond controls.
Next, we exclude speculative grade bonds, in case they have a different relation to ratings than investment grade bonds. The sample is only slightly smaller, since most bond trades in the data are for investment-grade bonds. Indeed, the effect of ratings is smaller for these firms, although still highly significant. The interaction of Fitch's market share and ratings has a similar magnitude, relative to the average effect of ratings. 30 So far, we have discussed the slope of the relationship between yields and ratings. An alternative way of assessing the informativeness of ratings is to study how they contribute to the Rsquared. To do this, we run first stage regressions with all controls except ratings, and then regress residuals from the first stage on bond ratings. In a second stage, done separately for subsamples by However, a more direct way of addressing this is to look at the price only at time of issue. The Mergent/FISD database contains yield spreads at issue and we can match these to early ratings using the same process as for the secondary market trades. In column four, we use these yield spreads at issue. As with data on secondary market trades, the implied correlation between credit ratings and bond yields is weaker when Fitch's market share is higher.
The magnitude is similar, but slightly lower than that found in the trade data. 29 We have also included the interaction of date (i.e., month-year) fixed effects and the natural log of time to maturity to absorb any variation in how bond premia may vary with bond age. Also, we have included controls based on estimated bond durations instead of maturities. These variations have only a marginal impact on the reported regression results. These results are available upon request. 30 We have tried clustering errors by bond issue, and consistently get much higher significance than reported in the tables (where errors are clustered by industry-year combinations).
Fitch market share, we can examine how R-squared varies. These tests agree with the t-tests from regression coefficients. For example, splitting the sample in half by competition, we find that ratings explain more of the residuals (from a regression on all controls apart from ratings and market share). For the high market share sample, the R-squared is 0.081, and for the low market share sample, it is 0.141 (the estimated coefficients on ratings are -0.094 and -0.215, respectively, and significantly different from zero and each other). Similar patterns are evident for other sample splits. Thus, we conclude that by this measure as well, ratings are more informative when competition is low.
The bond yield results show that the correlation of ratings and yields declines as competition increases. That is, bond yields (and spreads) are less related to credit ratings when Fitch has a high market share. In addition, ratings explain more of the variation in yields when competition is low, consistent with the slope findings. The implication is that credit ratings contain less yield-relevant information when competition is stronger. This is consistent with theories that predict lower quality (less informative) ratings when there is more competition.
Ratings shopping, which is the ability of issuers to choose the best rating from among a set of possible rating agencies, also appears consistent with our finding on the correlation of Fitch's market share with higher ratings levels. If ratings shopping really had a substantial impact on the level of some ratings, it could potentially explain our findings about informativeness as well (although this may not be very plausible). However, as mentioned in the Introduction, ratings shopping is much more likely for agencies other than the incumbents of S&P and Moody's since these two rate all US corporate bonds and issuers. Second, when multiple raters issue ratings, they tend to be fairly close to each other, so the scope for shopping even with Fitch's ratings seems modest. 31 31 Ratings of the other firms provide very visible comparisons for raters, so they may prefer to not deviate too much from each other. The potential mimicking tactics of rating agencies is beyond the scope of our paper and does not really relate to the main implications from the reputational models, which concern themselves with informativeness and (the average) level of ratings.
Third, although researchers have searched for it, there is limited evidence for ratings shopping among US corporate bond issuers (see Cantor and Packer (1997) and Jewell and Livingston (1999) ). The phenomenon is most likely related to just the market for structuredfinancial products, as modeled in Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2009) . In these markets, S&P and Moody's do not commit to rating every debt issue and thus the potential for ratings shopping is much greater.
Predicting default
We next examine what is perhaps the most direct measure of informativeness for credit ratings -their ability to predict defaults. This test is attractive because it directly examines the ability of ratings to predict the most important credit events. The disadvantage is that corporate defaults are rare, limiting the power of this test. This limit is likely to be especially problematic for higher ratings, where defaults are exceedingly uncommon. 32
Tests of the ability of ratings to predict default at the three year horizon are presented in Table 7 . Using a linear probability models (OLS), we regress indicators of future default on ratings and control variables. In column one, default in three years is regressed on a dummy for investment grade rating, Fitch's market share, and an interaction of these. All three variables are highly significant. The coefficient on the investment grade dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level, implying that firms rated investment grade are less likely to default than those rated noninvestment grade. The interaction is positive, meaning that the difference between investment grade and speculative grade default rates falls with competition. The magnitude of this effect is large.
Speculative grade firms are predicted to be 4.7 times as likely to default in three years as investment grade firms at median competition, but 7.7 times as likely with low competition (25 th percentile, 0.133) and only 2.2 times as likely at high competition (75 th percentile, 0.308). In column two, we replace the investment grade dummy with the numerical rating value (using the Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich scale), and uncover similar results. The scale uses finer variation, but at the expense of imposing a particular numerical scale, which may be inappropriate. As it turns out, the fit is slightly better, and the magnitude of the interaction remains large and significant at the 1% level. The predicted default probability of a B+ (the most common, non-investment grade rating) firm is 2.1 times that of a BBB rated firm (the most common, investment grade rating) at median competition, It can be argued that ratings should ideally predict default both conditionally and unconditionally, i.e., ratings should be informative about raw probabilities without taking any other information into account, as well as providing predictive power beyond what easily measurable accounting data can. The information transmission function of ratings concerns conditional predictability, whereas the risk classification function concerns unconditional predictability.
2.4 times at low competition (25 th percentile), and 1.5 times at high competition (75 th percentile).
The information content of ratings appears to diminish greatly as competition increases.
The results in column one and two are consistent with lower quality ratings when competition is strong, but may be affected by the absence of controls. We now examine how well ratings predict default after controlling for observables drawn from accounting data. In column three, year and industry fixed effects are also included, as well as the full set of firm controls. The significance and magnitude of the coefficient estimates for the variables of interest change slightly (the interaction is now significant at the 1% level). The overall fit of this model is better: the Rsquared is 2.4% (firm controls and the two sets of dummy variables contributes about half of the improvement each). Going from the 25 th percentile of the competition measure to the 75 th percentile, the effective slope on ratings falls by almost two thirds. This establishes several interesting points. First, defaults are better predicted by ratings and firm accounting data than by ratings alone. In other words, ratings are not sufficient statistics for the information in accounting data. Similarly for time and industry dummies, ratings do not fully incorporate all the time-and industry-variation in default rates. 33
Defaults arguably may be more difficult to predict in some years and in particular industries.
This could lead to smaller differences in default probabilities between investment and noninvestment grade firms. To control for this, we include interactions of ratings with all the year and industry fixed effects. The results are reported in column four. This specification leans very hard on the data, since there are fifty-three coefficients to estimate Second, even after controlling for these important determinants, corporate ratings still help predict defaults, and especially so when competition is limited. 34 33 This is consistent with some findings on cyclical default rates (e.g., Fons 1994). Such outcomes may be intentional. Adjusting ratings for the business cycle or other factors that simultaneously shift all or most default probabilities is probably cumbersome for raters.
, using a sample with less than two hundred defaults. The year and industry interactions are not well estimated with joint Chi-tests of 3.18 (significantly different from zero at the 7.4% level) and 2.07 (significantly different from zero at the 15.0% level). The model does worse than the model with firm controls in terms of R-squared.
The coefficient estimate for the interaction of ratings and Fitch's market share is slightly lower than the previous regression with firm controls. It remains significant at the 10% level. In the last column of Table 7 , we collapse data by industry-year cell. The dependent variable is the fraction of firms in a cell default within three years, and ranges from zero (in about three quarters of cells) to 0.0144. This is well explained by the linear model, which has an R-squared of 57%. Since the collapsed data has discarded all within-cell variation in default probabilities, this regression is identified only from across-cell variation. The coefficient estimate for the ratings -competition interaction is positive and significant as in the full panel regressions, but of slightly lower magnitude. The coefficient estimate for ratings drops by 14% going from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of the competition measure.
The regression results for the interaction of Fitch's market share and credit ratings all suggest that ratings quality is lower when competition is high. This is consistent with reputational models predicting less willingness to invest (through quality) in reputations when competition increases. It may also be consistent with ratings shopping. As competition increases, there are more ratings to choose from, and the published ratings may become less representative of the average credit opinion of raters. Again, the scope for ratings shopping is pretty limited in the market for corporate debt.
We also discussed above why reverse causality is unlikely to explain the higher ratings that coincide with a higher Fitch market share, and how credit demand is unlikely to be an important omitted variable. Another possible omitted variable problem has to do with the precision of ratings.
Fitch may have found it easier to gain market share where credit quality was hard to judge. This could lead simultaneously to poor predictability of ratings and high Fitch market share. If this mechanism generates our results, we cannot infer that competition is harmful to ratings quality. We can test the hypothesis that informational opaqueness drives entry with a measure how difficult it is to predict default. To construct such a measure, we separately estimate a linear probability model of default, with firm controls but without ratings, for each industry-year cell and record the R-squared.
Ninety-one such cells have at least one default and twenty observations, allowing us to estimate the model with all eighteen accounting ratios. The R-squared varies from 0.001 to 0.471. The variation in R-squared has no relation to Fitch's market share. 35 35 We assess this relationship in several ways. Regressing R-squareds on market share with year and industry dummies gives a coefficient of -0.16 and a t-stat of 1.4. Regressing the square root of the R-squareds on market share with both year and industry dummies gives a coefficient of -0.03 and a t-stat of 0.5. Weighting by the number of observations in each cell produces similar results (t-stats -0.39 and 0.56). The correlation and rank correlation between market share
We can also allow the eighteen controls to interact with Fitch's market share, and the interactions are generally insignificant (using a model similar to column three, we estimate a joint F-stat of 0.52 with a p-value 0.473). This suggests that reverse causality driven by preferential Fitch entry into difficult information environments is not an important driver of the correlation between Fitch's market share and the predictive power of ratings.
Instrumental Variables
The empirical strategy of this paper relies on industry-level variation in the extent to which Fitch competes with the incumbent rating agencies. We have argued that endogeneity is unlikely to explain our results, but may in fact understate the impact of competition on ratings levels. An econometric approach to addressing endogeneity of the market share is to find an instrument which is not subject to the same potential problem. We use this approach to repeat the Table 2 tests using instrumental variables (IV). We employ Fitch's predicted market share as an instrument for the actual market share. To construct predicted market share, we begin with Fitch's market share in an industry in 1995, and make a linear projection for that industry to the 2006 median market share (35.5%). 36 The start and end years of 1995 and 2006 are excluded. The instrument is highly correlated with the actual market share (the unconditional correlation is 0.463, significant at the 0.1% level).
Since this measure is predetermined, any concern about endogeneity (e.g., industries with high ratings attracting faster growth), is much weaker.
The intuition of the instrument is that a faster increase in competition is predicted in those industries where Fitch starts out with a low presence early in the sample. 37 and the residual of R-squared after controlling for year and industry, are -0.076 (p-value 0.472) and -0.086 (p-value 0.419).
The instrumental variable estimates are predicted to be smaller than those from OLS if there is positive correlation between ratings and competition due to reverse causality (i.e., Fitch was attracted to industries with high ratings). This is the concern we are trying to address. On the other hand, the IV approach will yield a larger estimated coefficient than OLS if there is negative correlation between ratings and competition (e.g., due to reverse causality). Based on the negative coefficient on the Fitch dummy in Table 3 , the latter may seem more likely. In other words, ratings shopping would cause OLS to underestimate the effect of competition on ratings, and the IV approach, being free of this bias, will 36 Algebraically, the instrument for year t and industry i is , � = ,1995 + 0.353 − ,1995 2006 −1995 . Instead of 0.355, we have also used 1/3, with similar results. 37 Market shares in 1995 might still be endogenous, but generally, that would tend to yield the opposite bias. This is because a high market share in 1995 predicts a lower increase in market share after 1995.
produce larger estimates. In addition, the instrument is less volatile than the actual market share, and if this reduces measurement error, there may be a smaller measurement error bias in our IV estimates.
Results of IV regressions are reported in Table 8 which replicates the regressions in Table 2 (columns one to four), but replaces OLS with two-stage least squares estimates. The first stage t-stat and the F-test (not reported) are always significant at the 0.1% level (see Staiger and Stock (1997) ).
In column one, with no controls, the estimated coefficient is 5.7, which is larger than the corresponding OLS coefficient (which is 2.4, cf. Table 2 ). The estimated coefficient is significant at the 5% level. In the other columns, regressions with additional controls are reported. The coefficients are consistently larger than the OLS estimates. The implied magnitudes are on the order of a one step increase in the ratings of half of all bonds for a one standard deviation increase in competition. The second column, with industry and year fixed effects provides a coefficient which is insignificant at the 10% level (although fairly close), while the third and fourth columns, which include firm fixed effects, produce estimates which are significant at the 1% level. Since the IV estimates are consistently larger than the OLS estimates, it is likely that some form of endogeneity is operating against our finding, implying that the true effect of competition may in fact be larger than the OLS findings suggest. It is also possible that no endogeneity affects our OLS results, but that measurement error in the measure of competition biases the coefficient toward zero, while the instrument is less noisy. Again, the higher IV coefficients are more indicative of the impact of competition that we have uncovered throughout the entire analysis of the paper. The instrumental variables estimates are, however, more complicated and less consistent across specifications. The most prudent interpretation of these results may be to confirm the significance of a negative causation from competition to ratings levels, without inferring too much about magnitudes.
Conclusions
Credit ratings perform a function of critical importance to the financial system. We find that the entry of a third major rating agency coincides with lower overall quality, as measured by both the levels and informational content of incumbent agencies' ratings. The negative link between competition and quality is econometrically robust and unlikely to be explained by the sources of reverse causality and omitted variables bias we examine. It also appears unlikely that ratings shopping can explain these patterns.
The effect of competition on incumbent quality is of substantial economic magnitude. A one standard deviation increase in Fitch's market share is predicted to increase the average firm and bond rating by between a tenth and half of a step (and increases it significantly more for more highly-levered firms). Moving from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of our competition measure reduces the conditional correlation between ratings and bond yields by about a third and reduces the conditional predictive power for default events at a three year horizon by two thirds.
Our results have potential policy implications. For regulators, it is worth considering that increasing competition in the ratings industry involves the risk of impairing the reputational mechanism that seemingly underlies the provision of good quality ratings. There may obviously be benefits of competition in other areas. Nevertheless, calls for more competition, such as by the U.S. (1998, 2009) , deserve a caveat. For bond markets, it is clear that relying on third party ratings paid for by issuers is a system with limitations. Our empirical findings suggest that the system works better when competition is not too severe. Leverage is debt over total assets. Yield spread is the yield to maturity minus the yield of the closest maturity treasury bond. Somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher-rated categories. However, the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is still strong. BBB 18, 19, 20 Exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation. (5) and (6), data are collapsed by industryyear cell (averages and medians, respectively). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for the coefficient estimates are in parentheses. Errors are clustered by industry*year cell in column (1) to (4). (5) and (6) which refer to 1996-2006. The left hand side variable refers to credit opinion ratings by Standard and Poor's and is coded from 28 (AAA) to 1 (D). See Table 1 for details. For column (1) to (4), the unit of observation is an individual bond rating. For columns (5) and (6), the unit of observation is industry-year cell, and all variables are the averages (column 5) or medians (column 6) of all observations in that cell. Cells with less than ten bond ratings are excluded. Fitch market share is the fraction of bond ratings in an industry-year cell performed by Fitch Ratings. Fitch rating (dummy) is a dummy variable taking the value one if Fitch issued a rating for the bond issue in the same calendar year as the rating was made. Industries are 2-digit level North American Industry Classifications System (NAICS) industries. Previous rating refers to the same bond issue's preceding rating. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for the coefficient estimates are in parentheses. Errors are clustered by industry*year cell in column (1) to (4). Notes: Each coefficient estimate refers to one OLS specification (different rows represent regressions which differ only in the timing of the independent variable). Each regression includes year and industry fixed effects. For each regression, the coefficient estimate for Fitch's market share is reported. The sample period is from 1995 until 2006. Number of ratings issued is the log of the aggregate number of credit ratings issued for bonds in an industry. Industry debt is the log of the total amount of outstanding debt of Compustat firms in an industry. The change in industry debt is the log of industry debt minus it's previous value. Industry profitability is an asset-weighted average of the ratio of EBITDA to assets in Compustat firms in the industry and Industry profitability (median) is the median EBITDA-asset ratio across all Compustat firms in the industry. Fitch market share is the fraction of bond ratings in an industry-year cell performed by Fitch Ratings. The number of observations is 266 or fewer (some observations are lost due to lags). The standard errors for the coefficient estimates are in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity-robust. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: Each column presents the coefficient estimates from an OLS regression. Intercepts not reported. Each observation is the yield to maturity of a bond in one transaction. The sample period is from 1995 until 2006. The dependent variable is the yield to maturity minus the yield to maturity of the government bond with the closest maturity. Credit ratings are bond credit ratings issued by Standard and Poors and Moody's (reported by FISD), and represent the latest preceding the transaction (if several were issued simultaneously, we use the average), not older than three months. Fitch market share is the fraction of bond ratings in an industry-year cell issued by Fitch Ratings. Industries are 2-digit level North American Industry Classifications System (NAICS) industries. Bonds are excluded if they have non-standard features (see text for details), negative yields or yields above 20%. The standard errors for the coefficient estimates are in parentheses and are clustered by industry*year cell. Year Fixed Effects X X X Industry Fixed Effects X X X Year and Industry FE * Rating X Firm controls X X R 2 0.008 0.001 0.024 0.024 0.571 N N = 18,707 N = 18,650 N = 15,661 N = 18,650 N = 189
Department of Justice

Baa
Notes: Each column presents the coefficient estimates from an OLS regression. Intercepts not reported. Each observation is one firm-year where firm level controls can be identified and where the firm is identified as defaulting or not defaulting in three years. The sample period is from 1995 until 2005. Fitch market share is the fraction of bond ratings in an industry-year cell issued by Fitch Ratings. Industries are 2-digit level North American Industry Classifications System (NAICS) industries. Firm characteristics are the log of sales, log of book value of assets, cash divided by total assets (and it's square), EBITDA divided by total assets (and it's square), cash flow over total assets (and it's square), EBITDA over sales (and it's square), cash flow over sales (and it's square), PPE over total assets (and it's square), interest expense over EBITDA (and it's square), debt over total assets (and it's square), and the log of sales and the log of assets, all measured at the end of the previous fiscal year (using accounting data from Compustat). In column (5), data is averaged by industryyear cell. The standard errors for the coefficient estimates are in parentheses and are clustered by industry*year cell. in column (1) to (4) and heteroskedasticity robust in all columns. Notes: Each column presents the coefficient estimates from an OLS or ordered probit specification. Intercepts not reported. The sample period is from 1996 until 2006. The left hand side variable refers to credit opinion ratings by Standard and Poor's and is coded from 28 (AAA) to 1 (D). See Table 1 for details. Fitch market share is the fraction of bond ratings in an industry-year cell performed by Fitch Ratings. Fitch rating (dummy) is a dummy variable taking the value one if Fitch issued a rating for the bond issue in the same calendar year as the rating was made. Industries are 2-digit level North American Industry Classifications System (NAICS) industries. Previous rating refers to the same bond issue's preceding rating. The standard errors for the coefficient estimates are in parentheses and are clustered by industry*year cell. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
